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Harkin: State v. Whitlow and Ineffective Counsel

ARTICLE

STATE V. WHITLOW AND INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL:
NO RECORD, FORESHADOWING THE RECORD,
AND MAKING A RECORD
Judge Douglas C. Harkin*

INTRODUCTION
Joe Chastain may have wondered why his defense counsel
didn't ask follow-up questions of the two jurors who expressed
reservations, given the nature of the charges, about their ability
to judge his case fairly. Neither juror was challenged for cause
or excluded by the use of the defendant's peremptory challenges.
Upon direct appeal of the defendant's convictions for sexual
intercourse without consent and sexual assault, the Montana
Supreme Court remanded the case for retrial.1 The Court said
that when "defense counsel abandons his client's right to
challenge a juror for no apparent reason, error must be
attributed to the lawyer." 2 Even the presence of one juror who
* State District Court Judge; B.S., University of Montana; J.D. University of
Montana; Master of Judicial Studies, University of Nevada/Reno.
Judge Harkin
acknowledges the assistance of his secretary, Pam Schneider, and Alanah Griffith of the
Montana Law Review.
1. State v. Chastain, 285 Mont. 61, 947 P.2d 57 (1997). As the presiding judge
at Chastain's trial, I certainly wondered. The proposal contained herein would have
helped; hindsight is a great teacher.
2. Id. at 65.
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could not fairly assess the credibility of the witnesses must be
3
presumed prejudicial.
Chastain made it very clear that defense counsel must ask
follow-up questions when a prospective juror makes statements
which suggest bias against the defendant. The trial record in
Chastain did not contain any reason why, after jurors indicated
their possible bias against the defendant, defense counsel
neither inquired further nor removed the jurors with a
peremptory challenge. The absence of reasons "why" defense
counsel did not act was sufficient to find ineffective assistance of
4
counsel.
The Chastain rule, that a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel could be found in a record devoid of reasons defense
counsel did not ask follow-up questions of apparently biased
jurors, stood as good law for only four years. Not discussed in
Chastain,but ready to pounce on an unwary defendant, was the
rule that when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
based on facts of record in the underlying case, they must be
raised in the direct appeal. 5 Conversely, where ineffective
assistance of counsel claims cannot be documented from the
record, those claims can only be raised by petition for post6
conviction relief.
Kenneth Whitlow may also have wondered why his defense
counsel didn't ask follow-up questions when jurors in his
kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent trial said it
would be "hard to be impartial" and "the nature of the case is an
upsetting thing. ' 7 On direct appeal, with appellate counsel
different from trial counsel, Whitlow did not raise a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel and his conviction was
affirmed.8 Over a year later, Whitlow's new appellate counsel
filed in the trial court a petition for post-conviction relief
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
The trial court
dismissed Whitlow's petition for post-conviction relief because
support for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could be
found within the trial record. Since the claim could have
reasonably been raised on direct appeal, the trial court held it

3.
4.

United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979).
Chastain, 285 Mont. at 65.

5.

MONT. CODE ANN. §46-21-105(2) (2001).

6.
7.
8.

Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8,293 Mont. 60, 973 P.2d 233 (1999).
State v. Whitlow, 2001 MT 208, 9 14, 306 Mont. 339, 9114, 33 P.3d 877, T 14.
State v. Whitlow, 285 Mont. 430, 949 P.2d 239 (1997).
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was time barred under §46-21-105, M.C.A.9
On appeal of the trial court's dismissal of Whitlow's petition
for post-conviction relief, the Montana Supreme Court was
compelled to fully address the argument that they must overrule
Chastain to allow Whitlow's petition for post-conviction relief.
Whitlow's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was based
upon voir dire answers nearly identical to those presented in
Chastain.0 Responding to this argument compelled the Whitlow
court to be sharply divided: a four judge majority, a special
concurrence by the author of the majority opinion, a combination
concurrence and dissent, and finally a third concurrence. The
concurring/ dissenting opinion ominously predicted that: "Our
approach here -parsing the sorts of voir dire responses for which
the failure to follow up will be considered presumptively
prejudicial - provides no guidance to the practicing bar and will
generate nothing but confusion along with the necessity to
appeal every case involving a Chastain issue.""
This case note discusses the Whitlow court's conflicting
explanations for defense counsel's actions, the dilemma Whitlow
presents to defense counsel and the court, and proposes a
modest solution.
BACKGROUND
Jurors Felix, Sellers, and Brouelette made the comments
which were the focus point of Whitlow. Juror Felix said, during
voir dire examination by the county attorney, that he had "read
about it in the papers and discussed it with the family" but
acknowledged there was nothing that would prevent him from
"reserving judgment until all the evidence came in this case." 12
Juror Sellers said he hoped nothing would prevent him from
being impartial to either side, "but the nature of the case is an
upsetting thing." 3 Juror Brouelette said he could reserve
judgment but he had heard about the case and "read everything
that they put [in] the paper. I just don't know how partial-you
know-.. .1 do have three little girls, so it's hard to be
impartial."' 4 Whitlow's trial counsel did not ask any follow-up

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Whitlow, 2001 MT 208, T 9.
Whitlow, 2001 MT 208, T 19.
Id. at T 41.
Id. at T 14.
Id.
Id.
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questions or move to excuse any of these jurors.
To fully appreciate the nuances of the problem Whitlow
presented to the Montana Supreme Court, it is helpful to briefly
review the interplay between direct appeal and post-conviction
relief, ineffective assistance of counsel standards, and appellate
trial strategy.
DirectAppeal /Petition for Post-convictionRelief
First, the law is clear that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims which find support in the record must be raised on direct
appeal. 15 Grounds for relief that were or could reasonably have
been raised on direct appeal may not be raised, considered, or
decided in a petition for post-conviction relief. 16 Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims must be considered on an individual
basis.
A finding on direct appeal that counsel was not
ineffective does not automatically preclude consideration of
ineffective claims in a petition for post-conviction relief. In fact,
if consideration of matters outside the record is necessary to
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petition
for post-conviction relief is the only way the court can consider
7
the outside evidence.'
Strickland Test
Second, it is equally clear that Montana reviews claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test of
Strickland v. Washington.'8 The defendant is required to prove
that his counsel's performance was (1) deficient and (2)
prejudicial. On the issue of counsel's deficiency, it is presumed
that counsel's actions were based on sound trial strategy.
Counsel's trial tactics and strategic decisions are entitled to
great deference, and disagreement about tactics and strategy
cannot be the basis to find ineffective assistance of counsel.' 9
Appellate Counsel's Strategy
Third, Whitlow's second appellate counsel was faced with
the task of overcoming the Strickland presumption that trial
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8, 12, 293 Mont. 60, 12, 973 P.2d 233,
MONT. CODE ANN. §46-21-105(2) (2001).
Hagen, at 12.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Bone v. State, 284 Mont. 293, 306 944 P.2d. 734, 742 (1997).
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been abducted but escaped, he had "strong feelings about it" and
21
this could bias his feelings unfavorably toward the defendant.
The second juror said he had read something about the case and
22
it did "evoke some strong feelings."
In Whitlow, the State pointed out that the same "nothing in
the record" to explain "why" defense counsel didn't ask follow-up
23
questions that existed in Chastain was also found in Whitlow.
Ergo, because Chastain was reversed on direct appeal with
nothing in the record but the statements of the jurors to support
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the same
"nothing in the record" was available to Whitlow and should
have been raised on his direct appeal. Ergo again and marching
forward to the State's final conclusion, since Section 46-21105(2) M.C.A prohibits raising matters in petitions for postconviction relief that could have been raised on direct appeal,
Whitlow had no right to raise the ineffective counsel issue on a
petition for post-conviction relief. In a nutshell, with essentially
identical responses from jurors in both Chastain and Whitlow,
Chastain would have to be overruled if Whitlow was allowed to
have a post-conviction hearing.
Rejecting the State's argument, the four-member majority
in Whitlow stood by their decision that the Chastain jurors'
statements of "strong feelings" and how this could bias them
against the defendant did demand further inquiry by Chastain's
counsel. But, the statements of the Whitlow jurors that the case
was "unsettling" and that "it would be hard to be impartial" did
not demand further inquiry by Whitlow's trial counsel. 24 The
court in Whitlow believed "trial counsel could have known other
facts about these prospective jurors which led counsel to
reasonably believe that, despite their possible prejudices,
placing these jurors on the panel would be favorable to his
client."25 With that said, the Whitlow court remanded the case
to the District Court for a post-conviction hearing. Go figure; as
the dissent so aptly put it, ". . .if there is a rule of law lurking
somewhere in all of this, I am hard pressed to state what it is."26

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

State v. Chastain, 285 Mont. 61, 63, 947 P.2d 57, 59 (1997).
State v. Chastain, 285 Mont. 61, 64, 947 P.2d 57, 60 (1997).
Whitlow, 2001 MT 208 19.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 140.
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counsel's decision to not ask follow-up questions or challenge the
The Strickland
jurors was a conscious tactical decision.
presumption is often an insurmountable hurdle, but appellate
counsel had placed in the District Court record an affidavit of
Whitlow's trial counsel. In the affidavit, trial counsel admitted
he had no particular tactical reason for not questioning or
moving to remove jurors Felix, Sellers, and Brouelette. 20 The
judicial equivalent of a smoking gun, the trial counsel's affidavit
foreshadowed the evidence which would be presented at a postconviction hearing and was tantamount to conclusive proof of
ineffective assistance of counsel. If it could be considered at a
post-conviction hearing, it would undoubtedly compel a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If Whitlow could have a
post-conviction hearing, the pieces would fall neatly into place:
(1) trial counsel would testify consistent with his affidavit that
he had no particular tactical reason for not asking follow-up
questions or challenging the jurors, (2) the presumption that
counsel's inaction was sound trial strategy would be overcome,
(3) the unpursued statements of jurors who said the case was
"unsettling" and "hard to be impartial" would clearly establish
ineffective counsel, (4) ineffective counsel was prejudicial to the
defendant since the jurors were on the jury which convicted the
defendant, and (5) last, but most definitely not least, Whitlow
would get a new trial.
Placing the affidavit of Whitlow's trial counsel into the
record was a masterful stroke by Whitlow's second appellate
counsel. Indulging only slight speculation, the affidavit imposed
incredible pressure on the Supreme Court to permit its
consideration if the Court could find a way to allow a hearing for
post-conviction relief.
Navigating the Shoals of Chastain
But Chastain stood squarely in the way of a post-conviction
hearing. The State argued in Whitlow that the Supreme Court
in Chastain had held in the defendant's favor and found
ineffective assistance of counsel despite the fact that there was
"nothing in the record" to explain counsel's failure to ask followup questions or move to exclude the seemingly biased
prospective jurors. In Chastain, one prospective juror said he
had read about Chastain's case, and because his little sister had

20.

State v. Whitlow, 2001 MT 208,

18, 306 Mont. 339, T 18, 33 P.3d 877, T 18.
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ConcurringOpinions
Things start to get interesting with the concurring opinions
in Whitlow. Justice Regnier, author of the majority opinion,
wrote a separate concurring opinion to "express my view that,
had I the votes to do so, I would modify, in part, our holding in
Chastain.27 Justice Regnier felt that the statement of the
Chastain juror who saw an article about the case, and how it
invoked "strong feelings," was not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that counsel's decision was not the product of
sound trial strategy. He said there could have been numerous
reasons to keep the juror on the panel and, like the Whitlow
case, the trial record was not enough to find ineffective
28
assistance of counsel for the juror with "strong feelings."
Justice Regnier would have liked to modify the "holding in
Chastainto reflect that counsel's decision not to further question
or move to exclude this juror, without more, was not ineffective
29
assistance."
Justice Trieweiler concurred separately because he felt
Chastain was factually distinguishable from the Whitlow case
and he did "not believe this decision is in any way inconsistent
30
with our decision in (Chastain)."
Although the initial
statement of the Whitlow jurors indicated possible bias, during
further questioning by the county attorney, all the jurors said
that their "prior knowledge, feeling, or experience would not
prevent him or her from being impartial." 31 These subsequent
statements of impartiality seemed to Justice Trieweiler to
remove any need to ask follow-up questions or remove the
jurors. Regarding the Chastain decision, Justice Trieweiler said
it made no sense, if defense counsel had some special knowledge
about the jurors that made their damaging statements
irrelevant, to have questioned the jurors in the first instance
and seek court permission to examine at least one of the jurors
outside the presence of the other jurors. 32 Justice Trieweiler
also commented, in response to the opinion of Justice Nelson,
that he was of the opinion that the key consideration, when
follow-up questions are not asked of a juror who had made

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

State v. Whitlow, 2001 MT 208,
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 51.

27, 306 Mont. 339, 1127, 33 P.3d 887,
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statements suggesting bias, is whether the juror eventually
denies bias. If the juror finally denies being bias, there is no
presumed prejudice; when there is no ultimate denial of bias,
counsel's inaction is presumptively prejudicial. 33 Justice Cotter
joined in this concurrence.
DissentingOpinion
Justice Nelson was not particularly charitable to the
majority in his special concurrence and dissent. "Logical and
procedural inconsistency and legal error aside, I must also agree
with the State.. ."34 Justice Nelson first argued that Chastain
was not concerned with why defense counsel failed to ask followup questions.
"Rather, it was enough - presumptively
prejudicial, in fact - that he did not.. .And, we reached these
conclusions from a record silent as to defense counsel's rationale
or lack thereof."35 Therefore, to be logically consistent, "we
should similarly conclude that Whitlow's failure to raise his
Chastain claims on direct appeal statutorily bars those claims
from post-conviction review." 36 On the other hand, if the court
remands Whitlow for a post-conviction hearing, "then we should
37
overrule Chastain."
But Justice Nelson's strongest argument for overruling
38
Chastain was simply - "Chastain was wrongly decided."
Chastain's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should not
have been treated as a direct appeal issue but rather as a matter
best left to a post-conviction hearing where the court could learn
the why of counsel's actions.
But, because the record in
Chastain was silent about why defense counsel failed to ask
follow-up questions, "one can speculate all day long about why
counsel did not ask follow-up questions .... The point is that
39
without asking him or her, who knows?"
Regardless of whether Chastain should be overruled (per
Justice Nelson), modified (per Justice Regnier), or affirmed (per
Justice Trieweiler), it is abundantly clear that Justice Nelson
got it right when he wrote that the Whitlow decision "provides

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Whitlow, 2001 MT 208, $ 52, 306 Mont. 339, $ 52, 33 P.3d 887, 52.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 9134.
Id. at 9135.
Id. at 9136.
Id. at 9138.
State v. Whitlow, 2001 MT 208, $ 38, 306 Mont. 339, 91
38, 33 P.3d 887, %1
38.
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no guidance to the practicing bar and will generate nothing but
confusion along with the necessity to appeal every case involving
a Chastain issue. Rather than opting for a clearly expressed
rule, we have, to the contrary, muddied this area of the law
immeasurably. '40 I agree.
ANALYSIS
What a mess! Should the prosecutor, defense counsel, and
the trial judge: (1) simply ignore the Chastain! Whitlow tangled
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and let the issue be
sorted out on appeal or (2) take action at the time of trial to
clear up the issue by making a trial record which removes the
ChastainI Whitlow conundrum?
Without thinking the matter to its final conclusion, the
prosecution may be pleased that defense counsel apparently
didn't notice that the juror indicated a bias against the
defendant. Moving quickly along to other jurors and hoping
defense counsel doesn't move to remove the juror with a
peremptory challenge only leaves a ticking time bomb for
appellate counsel to raise on direct appeal - Chastain style - or
throw back into a post-conviction hearing - Whitlow style.
Either way, the case may have to be tried again; bad result.
Defense counsel may simply decide to not question the juror
further and remove the juror with a peremptory challenge.
However, if more jurors make such remarks than can be
removed with the number of peremptory challenges allowed, and
defense counsel has not asked follow-up questions of any of
them, defense counsel will be faulted. Defense counsel may
have a good reason to keep the juror on the panel and does not
want to risk revealing the reason by asking follow-up questions;
a good strategy until the defendant is found guilty but defense
counsel has no record to support his trial strategy. Finally,
defense counsel may simply have been distracted and not
mentally processing a juror's reply indicating bias. Obviously
not fair to the defendant, embarrassing to defense counsel, and
again - defense counsel was in error. Another bad result.
The trial judge wants a fair trial. The emphasis is on "a"
and "fair." Not two trials, and not a trial tainted by ineffective
assistance of counsel. The trial judge is placed in a very
awkward position when defense counsel does not ask follow-up

40.

State v. Whitlow, 2001 MT 208, 1 41, 306 Mont. 339,
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questions after a juror indicates bias against the defendant.
Does defense counsel: (1) simply believe the juror does not have
bias against the defendant, (2) intend to remove the juror by a
peremptory challenge if the prosecution doesn't strike the juror,
(3) have special information about the juror that more than
offsets the indicated bias, (4) have a lack of awareness that the
juror's answer was bias against the defendant, (5) believe the
bias shown was not worth the risk of aggravating the juror if the
judge would not strike the juror, (6) et cetera, et cetera, et
cetera? As Justice Nelson so aptly put it, ". . .who knows. ..7
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Hearing
And so, we come to the heart of this case note: a procedure
that can be used at the time of trial that will place into the
record the "why" that is so elusive. If successful, it would benefit
all of the trial participants and save the appellate court the
wrenching hair splitting (the "parsing" described by Justice
Nelson 41 ) over what constitutes a juror answer that demands
follow-up questions. The obvious and basic problem is the trial
record; it contains the juror's potentially bias answers, no followup questions, and no apparent reasons for defense counsel's
inaction. "Light" juror bias begs for a post-conviction hearing
(per Whitlow). Alternatively, the "heavy" juror bias, even
though defense counsel may have had very valid reasons for not
asking follow-up questions, gets the case remanded for a new
trial (per Chastain). The problem is exacerbated when the
ineffective counsel issue is not raised on direct appeal, the
ineffectiveness is clear (per Chastain) or not clear (per Whitlow),
or the juror's answers are susceptible to different interpretations
(per the Whitlow concurring opinions on Whitlow and proposed
modifications to Chastain). With that said, what it comes down
to is that a trial record devoid of reasons for defense counsel's
failure to ask follow-up questions does not give justice to the
defendant, a solid conviction to the prosecutor, a good reputation
to the defense counsel, and one fair trial to the trial judge.
Don't despair - embodied within the opinions of Justice
Nelson and Justice Regnier may be a solution. Justice Nelson
said ". . .without asking him or her, who knows?'
Justice
42
Regnier made reference to People v. Mendoza.
41. State v. Whitlow, 2001 MT 208, T 41, 306 Mont. 339, 41, 33 P.3d 887, T 41.
42. 6 P.3d 150, 172, (Cal. 2000) stating that claims of ineffective assistance must
be denied "unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one. .."
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Asking for Reasons
What a novel idea: just ask defense counsel for an
explanation. The reasons will then be in the record and no one
has to guess or speculate about defense counsel's secret
information, the cleansing power of subsequent avowals of
impartiality, or whether defense counsel was just careless.
Asking, or allowing, defense counsel to place in the trial
record the reasons for not asking follow-up questions or
challenging an apparently biased juror has its own set of
problems. First, the prosecution and trial judge must be alert
and recognize the apparent bias of the juror. Second, there must
be an appropriate time to bring the matter forward without
damaging defense strategy if the reasons are proper, but before
the defendant is irretrievably damaged if defense counsel is
clearly ineffective. Third, defense counsel must be able to make
a record for counsel's own protection without disclosing defense
strategy to the prosecution. Finally, the trial judge must be
fully appraised of defense counsel's reasons in order to have a
substantive basis to find defense counsel acted properly. Such a
finding by the trial judge would be appreciated by the
prosecution and defense counsel because it would likely be given
considerable weight upon appeal. On the other hand, if the trial
judge finds defense counsel is ineffective, it would serve to
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial by removing defense
counsel immediately.
If asking defense counsel to place on the record the reasons
for not asking follow-up questions or challenging apparently
biased jurors seems likely to settle most conflicts spawned by
Chastain and Whitlow, the mechanics of "when" and "how" of
making the record must not be permitted to consume the
solution. In this regard, Batson v. Kentucky 43 may be helpful.
Batson was concerned with peremptory juror challenges being
based on improper discriminatory reasons and permitted the
trial court to hold an immediate hearing to consider the issue.
In a like manner, when an apparently biased juror is not asked
follow-up questions or challenged for cause, the trial judge could
hold a hearing to consider whether counsel is ineffective.

[emphasis added].
43. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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When to Raise the Issue
Timing soon became an important consideration in Batson
hearings. The Batson decision did not identify the time at which
allegations of discriminatory challenges need to be made and
considered by the trial court. 44 Recently the Montana Supreme
Court considered this precise issue and held that the latest time
the Batson challenge can be made is after the peremptory
challenges are made but before the jury is sworn and before the
venire is dismissed. 45 Logically, this makes sense because it is
only after all preemptory challenges are made that all the
discriminating behavior is disclosed.
The time for an ineffective assistance of counsel hearing
should be immediately after the issue is fully presented. When
the issue is the failure of defense counsel to ask needed followup questions involving one or marry jurors, it may be necessary
to take into account all of the voir dire, not just the failure to ask
questions of the particular juror urrently being examined. On
balance, in the absence of an egregious situation which demands
immediate intervention (i.e. a prospective juror says the
defendant is clearly guilty and a challenge for cause is not
made), it seems most appropriate to wait until all jurors have
been examined but before the exercise of peremptory challenge.
Caveat - do not wait to raise the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel until after the jury is impaneled and
sworn. Jeopardy to the defendant attaches the moment the jury
is impaneled and sworn. Following the holding of Keating v.
Sherlock,46 the Montana legislature amended Section 46-11-503
M.C.A. and provided that a second prosecution for the same
offense is barred if the former prosecution was terminated for
reasons not amounting to an acquittal and took place in a jury
trial when the jury is impaneled and sworn. 47. If the trial court
finds it necessary to remove defense counsel as ineffective before
the jury is sworn, jeopardy has not attached; the case may
proceed to trial, on another day, after the defendant is
represented by more effective counsel.
The prosecution
undoubtedly would appreciate this opportunity for another trial
and is less likely to want to press forward with the present trial
in the face of grave concerns about ineffective counsel.
44.
45.
46.

State v. Ford, 2001 MT 230, T122, 306 Mont. 517, Tf22, 39 P.2d 108
Id. at TT 26-28.
278 Mont. 218, 924 P.2d. 1297 (1996).

47.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-503(1)(d)(i) (2001).
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How to Raise the Issue
With the "when" set at immediately after voir dire closes, it
is appropriate to turn to the "how" of raising the issue of
ineffectiveness of defense counsel. Timing is important when
bringing the Chastain/Whitlow issue before the court for an
ineffective assistance of counsel hearing. There are basically
two scenarios. First, either the prosecution or the trial judge
has concerns that defense counsel did not ask follow-up
questions or challenge jurors who indicated bias toward the
defendant. Alternatively, or coextensively, defense counsel may
want an expanded record for any of several reasons: (1) to
prevent future allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel by
letting the record contain the reasons for not asking follow-up
questions or not making challenges for cause, (2) to show that
the defendant has been appraised of the reasons for defense
counsel's actions, or (3) to obtain a ruling from the trial judge
that counsel was not ineffective.
In the aftermath of Whitlow, trial judges should be alerted
to an ineffective assistance issue when defense counsel does not
ask follow-up questions or challenge jurors indicating bias. The
same awareness can be expected of the prosecution because of
their interest in a solid conviction. Likewise, defense counsel's
desire to avoid the legal and professional problems associated
with claims of ineffective counsel should increase awareness.
The issue is most likely to be raised by the prosecution
requesting to make a motion outside the presence of the jury,
defense counsel requesting permission to place a matter on the
record outside the presence of the jury, or the trial judge
excusing the jury while a "procedural matter" is considered.
Both prosecution and defense counsel must move swiftly with
their request for an ineffectiveness of counsel hearing before any
peremptory challenges are made.
Ineffectiveness HearingProcedure
When a request is made for a Chastain/Whitlow hearing,
the judge should adjourn to chambers with the prosecutor,
defense counsel, defendant, and court reporter.
After the
ineffective assistance of counsel question is placed in the record,
the judge should excuse the prosecutor from the room and let
the "why" be placed in the record. The prosecutor should not be
present because the prosecutor should not be exposed to defense
strategy, defense counsel's knowledge of special information
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2002
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about a juror, possible arguments between defendant and
defense counsel, and challenging questions from the trial judge.
The jury is not present for the same reasons. The record should
reflect that the prosecutor and jurors are not present, but that
the Defendant is present. What might be helpful to the judge is
a written list of questions from the prosecutor to be answered by
defense counsel, if deemed appropriate by the trial judge,
addressing Chastain/ Whitlow concerns.
Ineffectiveness Hearing Questions
An ineffectiveness of counsel hearing could be as simple as
asking or allowing defense counsel for an explanation of his/her
actions. Or, it could become rather involved as the trial judge
inquires into defense counsel's trial strategy, calculations of
degree of juror bias, or possession of special information about
an apparently biased juror.
At the ineffectiveness of counsel hearing, the basic question
was appropriately framed by Justice Nelson - "why?".48 What
will guide the "why" inquiry is whether defense counsel's
explanation is reasonable.
As the Court said in State v.
49
Harris:
When a tactical or strategic reason for defense counsel's
alleged deficient performance is apparent in the record on
appeal or proffered by counsel in post-conviction proceedings,
the court must evaluate whether this underlying reason is
"reasonable" before indulging the strong presumption demanded
by Strickland that a tactical or strategic act falls within the
wide range of reasonable and sound professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65; Jones v.
Wood (9th Cir. 1997), 114 F.3d 1002, 1010. When a challenged
act or omission reflects an unreasonable defense strategy, stems
from neglect or ignorance, or results from a misunderstanding of
the law, counsel's deficient performance meets the first prong of
50
the Strickland test.
Unreasonable defense strategy, neglect, ignorance, or
misunderstanding of the law will meet the first prong of the
Strickland test. Accordingly, a few preliminary questions come
to mind: Does defense counsel recall the answers given by the
48.
(Nelson,
49.
50.

State v. Whitlock, 2001 MT 208, 40, 306 Mont. 339, 40, 33 P.3d 887,
J., concurring and dissenting).
2001 MT 231, T 22,306 Mont. 525, 22, 36 P.3d 372 22.
See also State v. Gonzales, 278 Mont. 525, 532, 926 P.2d 705, 710 (1996).
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jurors? How does defense counsel evaluate these answers?
What is defense counsel's understanding of the law that applies
to disqualification of a juror for bias? How does not asking
follow-up questions fit into defense counsel's overall trial
strategy? Why weren't the jurors challenged? Does defense
counsel intend to remove the jurors in question by peremptory
challenges? If so, why weren't the jurors challenged for cause?
Once the record has been made with the reasons defense
counsel did not ask follow-up questions or challenge the juror,
most of the problems associated with Chastain/Whitlow
dichotomy are resolved. The trial court can make a finding that
the trial should continue because defense counsel's action was
"reasonable," and therefore the first prong of the Strickland test
has not been met, or alternatively, that defense counsel is
ineffective and should be removed.
Options After Ineffective Counsel Hearing
What is also instructive from Batson are the options

available to the trial judge when discriminatory conduct occurs.
The Montana Supreme Court in Ford5' noted that in Batson the
U.S. Supreme Court offered the following alternative
possibilities upon a finding of discrimination: the court may
discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not
previously associated with the case, or it may disallow the
discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the
52
improperly challenged jurors reinstated in the venire.
Essentially, either alternative allows the trial judge to "turn
back the clock" and correct the error of counsel and thereby
afford a fair trial to the defendant.
The Court in Ford was quite explicit about the prerogative
of the trial judge to take direct action to correct a Batson-type
error. After noting that a Batson challenge made after the jury
is sworn would ". . .deprive the district court of the ability to
correct any error in the proceeding in a timely fashion," the
Court further stated that it has ". . .consistently held that the
purpose of a timely objection is to give a district judge the first
opportunity to correct any error.5 3 Affording the trial court the
opportunity to correct the error of counsel in a timely manner
not only helps give the defendant an impartial jury, it is
51.
52.
53.

State v. Ford, 2001 MT 230,
Id.
Id., at 27.

23, 306 Mont. 517,

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2002

23, 39 P.2d 108,

23.

15

388

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 63 [2002], Iss. 2, Art. 6

Vol. 63

valuable to the prosecution's interest to not try the case a second
time. The trial judge in an ineffective counsel situation should
have the same opportunity to make a record or take appropriate
action when ineffective counsel is suspected.
The Record
When deciding a Batson discriminatory challenge, the trial
judge needs to make sure there is a record of all relevant facts
and a full explanation of the trial court's rationale.5 4 The
complete record and full explanation of the rationale are of great
assistance to the appellate court and to the trial judge's decision
making process. A similar procedure is appropriate for an
ineffectiveness of counsel hearing.
Regardless of whether defense counsel is removed at the
time of trial, the most valuable result of an ineffectiveness of
counsel hearing is that the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel can be easily resolved on direct appeal - there is no need
to speculate if defense counsel had secret reasons for not asking
follow-up questions.
Juror answers and defense counsel's
inaction may be evaluated by reference to the reasons given by
defense counsel. Further, it is to the defendant's advantage that
the trial judge has reviewed defense counsel's effectiveness at an
early stage of trial. It is of only modest consolation to a
defendant to gain a new trial after languishing in prison waiting
to present proof at a post-conviction hearing that his/her trial
counsel was ineffective.
CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court's attempt to reconcile Whitlow
and Chastain left the law in some confusion: what type of juror
answer demands follow-up questions, when should the
defendant claim ineffective defense counsel, does a juror's
subsequent claim of lack of bias cancel earlier statements of bias
or should follow-up questions still be required, and should
defense counsel risk alerting the prosecution to jurors that the
defense intends to peremptory challenge by comments designed
to explain not asking follow-up questions?
The proposal submitted herein, that before a jury is sworn
and the venire is discharged a hearing be held and a record

54. State v. Ford, 2001 MT 230, 18, 306 Mont. 517, T 18, 39 P.2d 108
U.S. v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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made to fully disclose defense counsel's reasons for not asking
follow-up questions or challenging apparently biased jurors,
would have the advantage of putting on the record the allimportant question about defense counsel's actions - "WHY?".
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